The State of Utah v. Mark Talbot : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1988
The State of Utah v. Mark Talbot : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Marcus Taylor; Labrum and Taylor.
Patrick B. Nolan; Garfield County Attorney.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Talbot, No. 880342 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1988).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/1119
snisr 
UTAH 
DOCUMENT 
KFU 
50 
.A10 Oo <-f)< 
DOCKET NO. - y * ^ ' 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
MARK TALBOT, 
Case No. 880342-CA 
l Argument Priority 
Classification: 
Defendant and Respondent. 
BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT 
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Garfield County, Panguitch City 
Department, Honorable David L. Mower. 
Marcus Taylor 
Labrum and Taylor 
108 North Main Street 
Richfield, Utah 84701 
Patrick B. Nolan 
Garfield County Attorney 
55 South Main Street 
Panguitch, Utah 84759 
DEPOSITED BY fHE 
STATE OF UTAH 
AUG1S1990 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
MARK TALBOT, 
Case No. 880342-CA 
i Argument Priority 
Classification: 
Defendant and Respondent 
BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT 
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Garfield County, Panguitch City 
Department, Honorable David L. Mower. 
Marcus Taylor 
Labrum and Taylor 
108 North Main Street 
Richfield, Utah 84701 
Patrick B. Nolan 
Garfield County Attorney 
55 South Main Street 
Panguitch, Utah 84759 
TABLE OF CONTE^io 
TABLE OF At JTHORITIES . . . 
INI r . . . . . . . 
STATEMENT KV I R I S D I C T K ' 
I J A/I r>r
 rrv* y ^ 
STATEMEN ; OF , S J U L b 
GOVERNING ST/YIFTI . 
' '" I: iJ : . . 
S I AIEMEN i uh b A.' i . 
STANDARD OF PFY1F ..... 
ARGUMEV 
±. THERE WAS REASONABLE SUSPICION TO STOP 
THl DEFENDANT'S VEHICLE IN :riHi.S •' ASI-
•Hit SIL.:- W--AL- rROPLR, BECAUSE .1 T -.7-.^  
INCIDENT TO TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS 
CONCI 1 JSIOI I .......'.........•........-. . . . . . . . . . .... . 
EXHIBIT ADDENDUM 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES PAGE 
Brierley v. Schoenfeld, 781 F. 2d 838 (10th Cir. 1986) 10 
City of Las Cruces v. Betancourt, 735 P. 2d 1161 
(N.M. App. 1987) 12, 17 
Jones v. State, 723 P. 2d 984 (Okla. Cr. 1986) 12, 17 
State v. Ashe, 745 P. 2d 1255 (Utah 1987) 5 
State v. Baumgaertel, 92 U.A.R. 50 (Utah App. 1988) 11 
State v. Carpena, 714 P. 2d 674 (Utah 1986) 9 
State v. Cole, 674 P. 2d 119 (Utah 1983) 8 
State v. Constantino, 732 P. 2d 125 (Utah 1987) 9 
State v. Folkes, 565 P. 2d 1125 (Utah 1977) 17 
State v. Gibson, 665 P. 2d 1302 (Utah 1983); cert. 
denied, 464 U.S. 894 (1983) 8 
State v. Hamilton, 710 P. 2d 174 (Utah 1985) 17 
State v. Houser, 669 P. 2d 437 (Utah 1983) 8 
State v. Mendoza, 748 P. 2d 181 (Utah 1987) 9 
State v. Sery, 758 P. 2d 935 (Utah App. 1988) 10 
State v. Sierra, 754 P. 2d 972 (Utah App. 1988) 10, 14, 15, 
17 
State v. Swanigan, 699 P. 2d 718 (Utah 1985) 9 
State v. Trujillo, 739 P. 2d 85 (Utah App. 1987) 10, 11, 13 
United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981) 7, 8, 11 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES, CONT. 
STATUTES PAGE 
Utah Code Annotated Section 41-6-12 15, 16 
Utah Code Annotated Section 41-6-13 14, 15, 16 
Utah Code Annotated Section 41-6-13.5 14, 15, 16 
Utah Code Annotated Section 41-6-67 16 
Utah Code Annotated Section 77-7-2 1, 2, 13, 16 
Utah Code Annotated Section 77-7-15 1, 2, 7, 8, 
10 
Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2a-3 (2) (d) and (e) 1 
INDEX TO ATTACHMENTS 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (April 22, 1988) 
Order Suppressing Evidence (May 13, 1988) 
Utah Code Annotated Section 77-7-15 
Utah Code Annotated Section 77-7-2 
-ii-
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction to decide this appeal, 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2a-3 (2) (d) and (e). 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
This appeal is taken by the prosecution from the Order 
Suppressing Evidence entered by the Circuit Court of Garfield 
County, State of Utah, on May 13, 1988. A suppression hearing 
was held on March 17, 1988. On April 27, 1988, the Court entered 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, resulting in the Order 
Suppressing Evidence which is the subject of this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Whether there was reasonable suspicion to stop 
defendant's vehicle, under Utah Code Annotated Section 77-7-15. 
2. Whether the act of defendant's vehicle turning 
around and fleeing from a roadblock constitutes reasonable cause 
to arrest the defendant, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 
77-7-2. 
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GOVERNING STATUTES 
1. Utah Code Annotated Section 77-7-15 provides as follows: 
A peace officer may stop any person in a public place 
when he has a reasonable suspicion to believe he has 
committed or is in the act of committing or is attempting 
to commit a public offense and may demand his name, address 
and an explanation of his actions. 
2. Utah Code Annotated Section 77-7-2 provides as follows: 
A peace officer may make an arrest under authority of 
a warrant or may, without warrant, arrest a person: 
1. for any public offense committed or attempted 
in the presence of any peace officer; "presence" 
includes all of the physical senses or any device 
that enhances the acuity, sensitivity, or range of 
any physical sense, or records the observations of 
any of the physical senses; 
2. when he has reasonable cause to believe a felony 
has been committed and has reasonable cause to believe 
that the person arrested has committed it; 
3. when he has reasonable cause to believe the person 
has committed a public offense, and there is reasonable 
cause for believing the person may: 
(a) flee or conceal himself to avoid arrest; 
(b) destroy or conceal evidence of the commission 
of the offense; or 
(c) injure another person or damage property 
belonging to another person. 
Copies of both statutes are included in the Appendix hereto. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant MARK TALBOT was charged by Information in the 
Circuit Court of Garfield County, Panguitch City Department with 
various alcohol and drug-related offenses. Defense counsel filed 
both a Motion to Suppress Evidence Based Upon Illegal Roadblock, 
and a Motion to Suppress Evidence Based Upon Illegal Stop. A 
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suppression hearing was held on March 17, 1988, and the parties filed 
various memoranda in support of their respective positions. On April 
27, 1988, the Court entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
On May 13, 1988, the Court entered its Order Suppressing Evidence, 
in which it denied defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence Based 
Upon Illegal Roadblock, but granted defendant's Motion to Suppress 
Evidence Based Upon Illegal Stop. Copies of the Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law and the Order Suppressing Evidence are included 
in the Addendum to this Brief. This appeal is taken from that Order 
Suppressing Evidence. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In the early morning hours on June 20, 1987, a roadblock 
was set up by the Garfield County Sheriff's Office on S.R. 143, com-
monly referred to as the Panguitch Lake Road, some 2^-3 miles South 
of Panguitch, Garfield County, State of Utah. (Suppression Hearing 
Transcript, hereafter referred to as "Tr.", pp. 8, 26-27.) Earlier 
that night, the roadblock had initially been set up on U.S. 89, South 
of Panguitch, pursuant to a plan made a few days earlier. (Tr., 
pp. 8,18,20-21,33-34) The roadblock was designed to stop all vehicles, 
traveling in both directions, to check on driver's licenses, vehicle 
registration, and safety equipment. (Tr., pp.8-9, 18-19) At approximately 
12:15 a.m., the roadblock was moved to the Panguitch Lake Road location. 
(Tr., pp.8, 26-27) 
The roadblock on S.R. 143 was manned by the Garfield County 
Sheriff, a deputy sheriff, and two members of the Sheriff's Posse 
who are Category II peace officers. (Tr., pp. 9,27) Two Sheriff's 
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vehicles were parked on either side of the road, facing in opposite 
directions, with their red and blue grill lights, red spotlights, 
and yellow emergency lights all flashing. (Tr. pp. 22-24, 104-105) 
In addition, the truck belonging to the Posse members was equipped 
with flashing red lights. (Tr., pp. 23 28) The officers were standing 
in the road with their flashlights on. (Tr., pp. 44, 119) 
At approximately 1:00 a.m., the officers at the roadblock 
observed a Southbound vehicle approach the crest of a hill located 
North of the roadblock. As soon as the driver noticed the flashing 
red, blue and yellow lights at the roadblock, the vehicle stopped 
abruptly, turned around in the middle of the road, and headed back 
North toward Panguitch. (Tr., pp. 9-11, 29, 44-45, 109) At the point 
where the vehicle turned around, on the crest of the hill, there 
are no turn-outs, and the road is a narrow, two-lane mountain road. 
(Tr., pp. 10,44-45,109,114) There are several wide turn-outs and 
road intersections along that portion of the Panguitch Lake Road, 
where a safe turn-around can be made, including the location of the 
roadblock, which had wide turn-outs on both sides of the road. 
(Tr., pp. 109,112,117,121-22) 
When the Sheriff observed the vehicle turn around suddenly 
and head back toward Panguitch, he suspected that the driver was 
attempting to evade the roadblock, since it stopped and turned around 
as soon as it came over the crest of the hill and observed the lights 
at the roadblock. (Tr., pp.11,29,46) Therefore, the Sheriff directed 
the two Posse members to pursue and stop the vehicle. (Tr., pp. 
16,30) 
As the Posse members pursued and eventually caught up 
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with the subject vehicle, on the way back toward Panguitch, the red 
flashing lights on the Posse truck were turned on, but the vehicle 
failed to pull over and stop. (Tr., pp. 47-48) The Posse members 
then called the Sherifffs Office in Panguitch by radio for assistance. 
(Tr., pp. 49, 69, 96) 
When the fleeing vehicle reached the outskirts of Panguitch, 
it turned off the main road onto a side street and headed down a 
back street in town. (Tr., pp. 50, 69, 91). A deputy sheriff and 
another Category II Officer, responding to the call for assistance, 
came from the other direction and intercepted the vehicle. (Tr., 
pp. 70,91-92). The Sheriff's vehicle turned on its red lights and 
stopped the vehicle. (Tr., pp. 72, 92, 100) 
The defendant was found inside the vehicle, with alcohol 
and marijuana, in the presence of juveniles. (Tr., pp. 84-85, 93-
94) He was subsequently arrested. (Tr., pp. 85, 93-94). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
"When faced with a motion to suppress, the trial court must 
determine whether proffered evidence is constitutionally defective. 
In making this determination, the court is often required to resolve 
preliminary factual disputes. Because of the trial court's position 
of advantage to observe witnesses' demeanor and other factors bearing 
on credibility, we will not disturb its factual assessment underlying 
a decision to grant or deny a suppression motion unless it clearly ap-
pears that the lower court was in error." State v. Ashe, 745 P. 2d 
1255 (Utah 1987) at 1258. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. When the defendant's vehicle came over the crest of 
the hill and saw the lights at the roadblock, it stopped abruptly, 
turned around in the middle of the road, and headed back toward town. 
Those actions gave rise to reasonable suspicion on the part of the 
officers at the roadblock that the occupants of the vehicle were en-
gaged in criminal activity. Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 
77-7-15, the officers were therefore entitled to stop the defendant's 
vehicle to investigate the matter further. 
2. The defendant's vehicle failed to stop at the road-
block, in spite of the flashing red lights which it observed as soon 
as it came over the crest of the hill. The defendant's vehicle stopped 
and turned around on the approach to, or near the crest of, a hill on 
a narrow, two-lane mountain road, with limited visibility in either 
direction. On the way back to Panguitch, the pursuing Posse vehicle 
again flashed its red lights at the defendant's vehicle, which failed 
to pull over and stop. Instead, when it arrived back in town, the 
defendant's vehicle turned off on a side street and headed down a 
back street in town. Those actions on the part of the defendant con-
stituted various traffic offenses committed in the presence of the 
officers, and, therefore, the stop of the defendant's vehicle was 
proper as incident to those traffic offenses. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THERE WAS REASONABLE SUSPICION TO STOP THE DEFENDANT'S 
VEHICLE IN THIS CASE. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 provides as follows: 
A peace officer may stop any person in a public place when 
he has a reasonable suspicion to believe he has committed 
or is in the act of committing or is attempting to commit 
a public offense and may demand his name, address and 
an explanation of his actions. 
Shortly after that statute was enacted in the State of 
Utah, in United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981), the United 
States Supreme Court explained the "reasonable suspicion " standard 
in these terms: 
"Courts have used a variety of terms to capture the elusive 
concept of what cause is sufficient to authorize police 
to stop a person. Terms like Articulable reasons" and 
"founded suspicion" are not self-d ef ining; they fall short 
of providing clear guidance dispositive of the myriad 
factual situations that arise. But the essence of all 
that has b ^ n written is that the totality of the circumstances-
the whole picture- must be taken into account. Based 
upon that whole picture the detaining officers must have a 
particularized and objective basis for suspecting the 
particular person stopped of criminal activity. ... 
The idea that an assessment of the whole picture 
must yield a particularized suspicion contains two elements, 
each of which must be present before a stop is permissible. 
First, the assessment must be based upon all of the circum-
stances. The analysis proceeds with various objective 
observations, information from police reports, if such 
are available and consideration of the modes or patterns 
of operation of certain kinds of lawbreakers. From these 
data, a trained officer draws inferences and makes deductions-
inferences and deductions that might well elude an untrained 
person. 
The process does not deal with hard certainties, 
but with probabilities. Long before the law of probabili-
ties was articulated as such, practical people formulated 
certain common-sense conclusions about human behavior; 
jurors as factfinders are permitted to do the same- and 
so are law enforcement officers. Finally, the evidence 
thus collected must be seen and weighed not ir terms of 
library analysis by scholars, but as understood by those 
versed in the field of law enforcement. 
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The second element contained in the idea that 
an assessment of the whole picture must yield a particular-
ized suspicion is the concept that the process just described 
must raise a suspicion that the particular individual 
being stopped is engaged in wrongdoing. ..." United 
States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981) at 417-418. (Emphasis 
added. ) 
In the eight years since Sect ion 77-7-15 was enacted, the 
appellate courts in the State of Utah have given some guidance on 
the dimensions of this " reasonable suspicion " standard in Utah. 
In State v. Gibson, 665 P. 2d 1302 ( Utah 1983), cert. denied, 464 
U.S. 894 (1983), the police stopped the defendant, based on the belief 
that his driver's license had been revoked, since the officer had 
previously arrested the defendant for drunk driving, and knew that 
his driver's license had previously been revoked. The Supreme Court 
held that the officer had a "reasonable suspicion" that the defendant's 
driver's license was still revoked, and upheld the stop of the defendant's 
vehicle. 
In State v. Houspr, 669 P. 2d 437 (Utah 1983), the defendant 
was observed pushing a handcart and loading it into his vehicle. 
The arresting officer knew the defendant, was acquainted with his 
possessions,and knew that he had a criminal record. The Supreme 
Court found that the articulable facts, taken together, with rational 
inferences therefrom, justified the stop of the defendant. 
In State v. Cole, 674 P. 2d 119 (Utah 1983), the police 
stopped the defendant's vehicle because it had no visible registration 
or plates. The Supreme Court held that there was an articulable 
and reasonable suspicion that the vehicle was not registered, and 
up held the stop, noting that "the police not only had a right to 
make the stop, they had a duty to do so." 674 P. 2d at 123.(Emphasis 
added. ) 
In State v. Swanigan, 699 P. 2d 718 (Utah 1985), the defen-
dant and his companion were stopped, based upon a description by 
another officer who had seen them walking along the street at a late 
hour, in an area where recent burglaries had been reported. The 
Supreme Court held that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to 
believe they were engaged in criminal activity. 
In State v. Carpena, 714 P. 2d 674 (Utah 1986), the defendant's 
car was stopped, having out-of-state license plates, moving slowly 
through a neighborhood where a rash of burglaries had recently occurred, 
late at night. The Supreme Court found that the officer had no objective 
facts on which to base a reasonable suspicion that the men were involved 
in criminal activity. 
In State v. Constantino, 732 P. 2d 125 (Utah 1987), the 
officer had learned, only days before the stop of the defendant's 
vehicle, that the defendant's license had been revoked, and that 
he was wanted on an arrest warrant. The Supreme Court found that 
those circumstances constituted sufficient reasonable suspicion 
to make the investigatory stop valid. In so doing, the Court held 
that " the statutory standard under which a police officer may stop 
and question a suspect is not, as defendant would have it, probable 
cause, but a reasonable suspicion which requires the officer to point 
to specific and articulable facts which warrant the intrusion." 
732 P. 2d at 126.(Emphasis added.) 
In State vs. Mendoza, 748 P. 2d 181 (Utah 1987), two Immigra-
tion officers stopped a car on the freeway, based upon the apparent 
"Latin descent" of the occupants, the route of travel, the time of 
day, the time of year, the California license plates, the erratic 
driving pattern,and the nervous behavior of the occupants. The Supreme 
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Court held that those facts did not support a reasonable suspicion 
that the defendants were engaged in illegal activity, and found the 
stop to be invalid. 
In Brierley v. Schoenfeld, 781 F. 2d 838 (10th Cir. 1986), 
the United States Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit interpreted 
the scope of Section 77-7-15. In that case, a Utah highway patrolman 
was found to have reasonable suspicion to stop a truck for a possible 
overweight violation, based solely upon his observation that the 
truck had "squatty" tires. The Court specifically found that such 
observation gave the officer the requisite "articulable and reasonable 
suspicion" under the statute. 
This Court, during the past two years, has addressed the 
reasonable suspicion standard on several occasions. 
In State v. Trujillo, 739 P. 2d 85 (Utah App. 1987), the 
officer stopped the defendant, based upon them being in a high-crime 
area, at a late hour, their apparent nervous conduct, and a "suspicious" 
nylon knapsack carried by the defendant. This Court found that the 
officer did not have reasonable suspicion that the defendant was 
engaged in criminal conduct, and that the stop was improper. 
In State v. Sierra, 754 P. 2d 972 (Utah App. 1988), the 
officer stopped the defendant, based upon his suspicious nature and 
the way he acted when he saw him. This Court held that there was 
no reasonable suspicion that the defendant had committed or was about 
to commit a crime . 
In State v. Sery, 758 P. 2d 935 (Utah App. 1988), the 
defendant was stopped at the Salt Lake International Airport, based 
upon his nervousness, itinerary, name discrepancy,and unpublished 
phone number. This Court found that those facts did not constitute 
reasonable suspicion that the defendant was engaged in illegal 
activity. 
In State v. Baumgaertel, 92 U.A.R. 50 (Utah App. 1988), 
the defendant was stopped, based upon the lateness of the hour, a 
rash of burglaries in the area, and at the store where the defendant 
was seen, a "hunch" that the truck was involved in criminal activity, 
and the fact that the defendant's truck had not been present at the 
site when the officer had passed by fifteen minutes before. This 
Court found that these factors were sufficient to establish reason-
able suspicion to believe that the defendant was engaged in criminal 
activity. 
In applying the foregoing precedents to the facts of this 
case, and in considering the reasonableness of the stop, it is import-
ant to remember that this Court must consider the totality of the cir-
cumstances facing the officers. United States v. Cortez, supra. Fur-
thermore, because a "trained law enforcement officer may be able to 
perceive and articulate meaning in given conduct which would be wholly 
innocent to the untrained observer", he may assess these facts in 
light of his experience. State v. Trujillo, supra, 739 P. 2d at 88-89. 
In this case, at the suppression hearing, the Court refused 
to permit Sheriff Judd to testify about his experience with regard to 
cars that have turned around and fled from roadblocks. (Tr., pp. 
11-16, 38-39) The State believes that the Court erred in excluding 
that evidence, and that the proffer of the Sheriff's testimony should 
have been admitted into evidence. 
Regardless of the admissibility of that evidence, however, 
Sheriff Judd articulated the following reasons for pursuing and stop-
ping the defendant's vehicle in this case: (1) the lateness of the 
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hour; (2) the lack of other traffic; (3) the flashing lights at the 
roadblock; (4) the abrupt stop of the vehicle, when it saw the lights 
at the roadblock; (5) the turn-around on the crest of the hill, as 
soon as the driver noticed the roadblock; and (6) the turn-around in 
the middle of the road, on a narrow mountain road, rather than at a 
turn-out or intersection. 
In light of his experience and training, Sheriff Judd im-
mediately suspected that the vehicle was attempting to avoid the road-
block. Indeed, it is difficult to conceive of an action which is more 
likely to arouse suspicion that the driver of the vehicle was attempt-
ing to avoid contact with law enforcement officers, and had something 
to hide, thus leading to the inference that the occupants of the ve-
hicle were engaged in criminal activity. 
Although this is an issue of first impression in this State, 
the courts in at least two other states have held that the very act 
of fleeing from a roadblock gives rise to reasonable suspicion to stop 
the subject vehicle. In City of Las Cruces v. Betancourt, 735 P. 2d 
1161 (N.M. App. 1987), two separate stops at a roadblock were consoli-
dated before the Court of Appeals of New Mexico. One of those defen-
dants had failed to stop at the roadblock, while the other had not. 
In the former case, the Court specifically held that failure to stop 
at the roadblock constituted a sufficient reason for the defendant to 
be stopped, 735 P. 2d at 1163, and the Court summarily affirmed the 
denial of her motion to suppress. 
Similarly, in Jones v. State, 723 P. 2d 984 (Okla. Cr. 
1986), the Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma considered a situation 
where the defendant had turned to avoid a roadblock. The Court found 
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that that act, alone, constituted a misdemeanor, and, under the Okla-
homa warrantless arrest statute, which is virtually identical to Utah's, 
the officer was justified in the subsequent stop and arrest of the 
defendant. 723 P. 2d at 985. 
"Because a determination of the reasonableness of the police 
conduct is highly factual in nature, we review the facts in detail." 
State v. Trujillo, supra, 739 P. 2d at 86. The State of Utah respect-
fully submits that the totality of the circumstances facing the offi-
cers in this case, considered in the light of their experience and 
training, gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that the occupants of 
the vehicle in question were engaged in criminal activity; and, there-
fore, that the finding by the Circuit Court that there was no reason 
to suspect criminal activity in this case was clearly erroneous. The 
Order Suppressing Evidence should be reversed by this Court. 
POINT II: THE STOP WAS PROPER, BECAUSE IT WAS INCIDENT TO TRAFFIC 
VIOLATIONS. 
Utah Code Ann. §77-7-2 provides as follows: 
A peace officer may make an arrest under authority of a 
warrant or may, without warrant, arrest a person: 
(1) for any public offense committed or attempted 
in the presence of any peace officer; "presence" 
includes all of the physical senses or any device 
that enhances the acuity, sensitivity, or range of 
any physical sense, or records the observations of 
any of the physical senses; 
(2) when he has reasonable cause to believe a felony 
has been committed and has reasonable cause to believe 
that the person arrested has committed it; 
(3) when he has reasonable cause to believe the 
person has committed a public offense, and there is 
reasonable cause for believing the person may: 
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(a) flee or conceal himself to avoid arrest; 
(b) destroy or conceal evidence of the commission 
of the offense; or 
(c) injure another person or damage property belong-
ing to another person. 
In this case, in addition to the officers having reasonable 
suspicion to believe that the occupants of the vehicle in question were 
engaged in criminal activity, the stop was also proper because it was 
made incident to traffic offenses which were committed in the presence 
of the officers. State v. Sierra, supra. 
First, while the Circuit Court may have been accurate in 
finding that there is no Utah statute requiring motorists, upon observ-
ing a road block, to continue thereto to stop, the State of Utah re-
spectfully submits that the Court was clearly in error in finding that 
Utah Code Annotated Section 41-6-13 did not apply, since the defendant 
never reached the road block; and that Utah Code Annotated Section 41-
6-13.5 did not apply, since there was no evidence that any signal was 
directed toward this defendant from the roadblock. 
Contrary to the Court's findings, the testimony at the 
suppression hearing was abundantly clear that, when the defendant's 
vehicle came over the crest of the hill, the occupants would have 
seen flashing red lights, yellow emergency flashers, and officers 
standing in the roadway with flashlights. (Tr., pp. 22-24, 104-105, 
118-119; Finding No. 5) Those lights would not have been easily mis-
taken for a traffic accident. (Tr., pp. 37-38) The defendant's ve-
hicle stopped abruptly and turned around in the middle of the road, 
as soon as it saw the lights at the roadblock. (Tr., pp. 11, 29) 
Thus, the fact that the defendant never reached the roadblock is 
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irrelevant, in view of the evasive action taken by the vehicle as soon 
as it became aware of the roadblock. 
Utah Code Annotated Section 41-6-13 provides as follows, 
in pertinent part: 
(1) A person may not willfully fail or refuse to comply 
with any lawful order or direction of any peace officer, ... 
Utah Code Annotated Section 41-6-1.3.5 provides as follows, 
in pertinent part: 
(1) An operator who, having received a visual or audible 
signal from a peace officer to bring his vehicle to a stop, 
operates his vehicle in willful or wanton disregard of the 
signal so as to interfere with or endanger the operation 
of any vehicle or person, or who attempts to flee or elude 
a peace officer by vehicle or other means is guilty of a 
Class A Misdemeanor. 
Utah Code Annotated Section 41-6-12 provides as follows: 
A violation of any provision of this chapter is a Class B 
misdemeanor, unless otherwise provided. 
The State of Utah respectfully submits that the defendant's 
failure to stop at the roadblock, after having received visual signals 
to stop by the red flashing lights at the roadblock, constitutes a 
violation of both Sections 41-6-13 and 41-6-13.5, and that the Court 
erred in finding that those statutes do not apply in this case. If, 
in fact, the defendant's actions constituted a public offense committed 
in the presence of the officers at the roadblock, then the stop was 
proper as incident to those traffic violations. State v. Sierra, supra. 
Second, during the pursuit of the defendant's vehicle by 
the Posse members on the way back to Panguitch, the testimony at the 
suppression hearing was clear that the red lights on the Posse truck 
were turned on, and that the defendant's vehicle made no effort to pull 
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over and stop in response thereto. (Tr.,pp. 47-48) Instead, when it 
reached the outskirts of Panguitch, the vehicle turned off the main 
road onto a side street, and then headed down a back street in town. 
(Tr., pp. 50, 69, 91) The State of Utah respectfully submits that 
the continuing evasive action taken by the defendant's vehicle, after 
having received a second visual signal to stop by the red lights on 
the Posse truck, constituted a separate and independent violation of 
Sections 41-6-13 and 41-6-13.5, and, therefore, the stop was proper 
under Section 77-7-2. 
Finally, the Circuit Court failed to recognize the applica-
tion of Utah Code Annotated Section 41-6-67, which provides as follows, 
in pertinent part: 
(2) A vehicle may not be turned to proceed in the opposite 
direction on any curve, or upon the approach to, or near 
the crest of a grade, if the vehicle is not visible at a 
distance of 500 feet by the operator of any other vehicle 
approaching from either direction. (Emphasis added.) 
At the suppression hearing, the testimony was undisputed 
that the roadblock was located approximately one quarter-mile from the 
crest of the hill where the defendant's vehicle turned around, and 
that the road is a two-lane mountain road traveling through pinyon 
and juniper trees. (Tr., pp. 112, 116-117) Since it was at 1:00 a.m., 
it could certainly have been inferred by the Court that the defendant's 
vehicle turned around on the approach to, or near the crest of, a hill 
where it was not visible for 500 feet in either direction. If so, then 
that act constituted a separate Class B misdemeanor, under Section 41-
6-12, committed in the presence of the officers, and would constitute 
an additional, independent ground for the stop under Section 77-7-2. 
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In State v. Hamilton, 710 P. 2d 174 (Utah 1985), the Supreme 
Court considered a case where the officer observed the defendant commit 
a misdemeanor traffic offense, followed the defendant to make a stop, 
and ultimately arrested the defendant. The Court held that, since the 
defendant failed to cooperate with the officer's investigation of the 
traffic offense which he had witnessed, the officer was justified in 
making an arrest to permit investigation and prosecution, and the ar-
rest was valid. 710 P. 2d at 175. 
In State v. Folkes, 565 P. 2d 1125 (Utah 1977), the Supreme 
Court observed, 
...When a police officer sees or hears conduct which gives 
rise to suspicion of crime, he has not only the right but 
duty to make observations and investigations to determine 
whether the lav/ is being violated; and if so, to take such 
measures as are necessary in the enforcement of the law. 
(Emphasis added.) 565 P. 2d at 1127. 
It is clear that a police officer may stop an automobile 
for a traffic violation committed in the officer's presence. State v. 
Sierra, supra. Therefore, even if this Court does not find, as have 
the Courts in New Mexico and Oklahoma, in City of Las Cruces v. Betan-
court and Jones v. State, cited above, that the act of turning and 
fleeing from a roadblock itself does not give rise to reasonable sus-
picion of criminal activity, or does not, itself, constitute a pub-
lic offense committed in the presence of the officers, the State of 
Utah submits that traffic violations were committed in the presence 
of the officers, and that the stop was proper as incident to those 
violations. The Order Suppressing Evidence should be reversed.-*-
1. The Order Suppressing Evidence denied defendant's Motion to Suppress 
Based Upon Illegal Roadblock, and defendant did not appeal that denial. 
Therefore, the constitutionality of the roadblock itself is not at issue 
before the Court in this case. 
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CONCLUSION 
For all of the foregoing reasons, the findings of the Cir-
cuit Court were clearly erroneous, and the Order Suppressing Evidence, 
in which the Court granted defendants Motion to Suppress Evidence 
Based Upon Illegal Stop, should be reversed by this Court. 
DATED this 31st day of October, 1988. 
PATRICK B. NOLAN 
Garfield County Attorney 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this 31st day of October, 1988, 
I mailed, postage prepaid, four (4) copies of the foregoing Brief of 
the Appellant to MARCUS TAYLOR of LABRUM, TAYLOR & BLACKWELL, Attor-
neys for Defendant, 108 North Main Street, Richfield, Utah 84701. 
Patrick B. Nolan 
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Case NO* 196 
Defendant. 
The above matter was considered by the Court on March 17, 
1988 pursuant to Defendant's motion to suppress evidence. At the 
hearing, witnesses testified and counsel argued the matter. 
Subsequently, memoranda have been submitted and considered by the 
Court. The evidence is sufficient to show the following facts: 
1. Robert V. Judd is the duly elected, qualified and 
acting sheriff of Garfield County, Utah. 
2. A few days before June 19, 1987, the Sheriff met two 
of his deputies in his office at Panguitch, Utah, where plans were 
made for the intended operation of road blocks. 
3. At the meeting general plans were made as to the 
time and location of the road blocks, i.e., that road blocks 
were to be held in a few days at four specific locations: River 
Lane, Panguitch Lake Road, Highway 89 North and Highway 89 South. 
Contact was made with the commander of the Sheriff's Posse since 
that organization would be providing supplemental personnel. 
STATE VS. TALBOT 
CASE 87-CR-196 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
PAGE -2-
4. On June 19f 1987 at about 10:00 P.M. a road block 
was established by the Garfield County Sheriff on U. S. Highway 89 
at Milepost 130, a location about three miles south and east of 
Panguitch, Utah. 
5. The road block was comprised of five people and four 
vehicles. The five people were the Sheriff, a Deputy and three 
members of the Sheriff's Posse. All were in uniform and carrying 
flashlights. The four vehicles were two police vehicles and two 
private vehicles. Each vehicle was equipped with standard, four-way 
emergency flashers, which were in operation. Each vehicle displayed 
a law enforcement symbol on the doors. Each police vehicle was 
equipped with a red spotlight mounted on the driverfs door post 
which was illuminated and flashing. 
6. The police vehicles were parked on the asphalt 
portion of the highway but outside the traffic lanes so as to face 
oncoming traffic. The private vehicles were parked on the shoulder 
of the highway. 
7. There were no flares, warning signs, nor any traffic 
control devices used. 
8. All traffic was stopped at the road block where the 
officers checked for drivers licenses, vehicle registration and any 
safety equipment violations. 
STATE VS. TALBOT 
CASE 87-CR-196 
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9. On June 20, 1987 at about 12:15 A.M. the Sheriff 
directed the personnel at the road block to disband and re-establish 
it on the Panguitch Lake Road at a location a few miles south of 
Panguitch, Utah. 
10. The road block was re-established at that location, 
minus one posse member and his private vehicle. 
At approximately 1:00 A.M. the officers saw two headlights of 
a southbound vehicle as it approached the road block. 
11. The officers observed that the vehicle stopped, made 
a "three-point" U-turn and drove off in the opposite direction from 
whence it came. 
12. No witness at the suppression hearing was able to 
identify any public offense committed by Defendant up to that time. 
In fact, at that point, no witness was able to identify the 
defendant at all, although he later turned out to be an occupant of 
the vehicle. 
13. No witness at the suppression hearing was able to 
give any reason to suspect that Defendant either had committed an 
offense, was in the act of committing an offense, or that he was 
attempting to commit an offense. 
14. The following Utah Statutes cited by the State do 
not apply for the reasons stated: 
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(a) 41-6-26 sincef by its own terms, it applies to 
traffic signals or signs which were not used in this 
case; 
(b) Section 41-6-13, since Defendant never reached 
the road block. 
(c) Section 41-6-13.5, since there is no evidence 
that any signal was directed toward this Defendant from 
the road block. 
15. There is no state statute requiring 
motorists, upon observing a road block, to continue thereto 
and stop. 
The foregoing Findings of Fact are sufficient to 
to support the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The road block was proper since it was 
planned in advance and since every car was stopped. 
2. The evidence seized from Defendant must be 
suppressed. It was seized in violation of (a) Article I, 
Section 14, Utah Constsitution, (b) U. S. Constitution, 
Amendments 4 and 14, and (c) Section 77-7-15 U.C.A. 
Dated this ^ D - day of AfQ- 19 %% . 
DaVICT'L. Mower, Circuit Judge 
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true, full and On the ^j^ 'day of 
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was placed in the United States mail, first-class postage prepaid, 
addressed as follows: 
Mr, Patrick B. Nolan, Garfield County 
Attorney, county Courthouse Building, 
Panguitch, Utah (84759). 
Mr. Marcus Taylor, Labrum & Taylor, Attorneys 
at Law, 108 North Main, Richfield, Utah (84701) 
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Garfield County Attorney 
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CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
GARFIELD COUNTY, PANGUITCH CITY DEPARTMENT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
v. 
MARK TALBOT, 
Plaintiff, ] 
Defendant, ] 
) ORDER SUPPRESSING EVIDENCE 
) Criminal No. 196 
This matter came before the Court for hearing on March 17, 
1988. The State of Utah was represented by Patrick B. Nolan, Garfield 
County Attorney. The defendant appeared in person, and was represented 
by Marcus Taylor, Richfield. After hearing and considering the evi-
dence introduced at the hearing, and the memoranda filed by counsel; 
and the Court having heretofore made and entered, in writing, its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
IT IS, THEREFORE, HEREBY ORDERED, as follows: 
1. That defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence Based Upon 
Illegal Roadblock be, and it is hereby, denied. 
2. That defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence Based Upon 
Illegal Stop be, and it is hereby, granted. 
DATED this '3 day of May, 1988. 
BY THE COURT: 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: Cjfcowrt Judge 
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Mail, postage prepaid, on this the \ 3 — day of May, 1988, addressed 
as follows: 
Mr. Marcus Taylor 
Labrum and Taylor 
108 North Main Street 
Richfield, Utah 84701 
Secretary 
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DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW 
Burden of proof. 
Merchant relying on former 77-13-32 to 
justify detention or arrest of a suspected 
shoplifter has burden to show reasonable and 
probable cause for believing items offered for 
safe had been unlawfully taken by th$ 
detained or arrested person; this section in 
essence codifies the preexisting common law 
defense of probable cause to effect an arrest 
and expands it to incorporate specific private 
persons in the shoplifting context. Terry v, 
Zions Co-op. Mercantile Institution (1979) 605 
P 2d 314. 
Liability. 
Store which had probable cause to detain 
suspected shoplifter's sister was not liable 
for false arrest even though sister was subset 
quently acquitted of shoplifting charge, 
Davis v. Zions Coop. Mercantile Institution 
(1973) 29 U 2d 336, 509 P 2d 362. 
Limitation of evidence. 
Where customer sued merchant for malK 
cious prosecution, false arrest and false 
imprisonment arising from alleged shoplift^ 
ing incident and introduced evidence the inck 
dent left her severely depressed and suicidal, 
merchant which wished to introduce evidence 
of a prior shoplifting conviction and its sur-
rounding facts as affecting the issue of dam-
ages was properly restricted to showing fact 
of the prior act and the identity of the party 
involved in view of, inter alia, the similarity 
of the incidents and substantial likelihood of 
confusing the jury. Terry v. Zions Co-op, 
Mercantile Institution (1979) 605 P 2d 314. 
Motive for arrest. 
Statute offered no civil immunity to a mer-
chant who initiated a customer's arrest for 
purpose of effecting a civil remedy to collect 
money owed, even if the money was lawfully 
owed; thus statute did not shield auto dealer 
from liability for false imprisonment where 
customer drove away in new truck after leav-
ing check for less than purchase price dealer 
was demanding and dealer called police and 
History: C. 1953, 77-7-15, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. 
Collateral References. 
Arrest <&=> 63.1, 6& 
asked that truck be picked up, saying there 
0 had been a theft; majority held that there 
 was a jury question as to whether dealer had 
<j reasonable cause to believe customer had 
>r committed larceny. Greenwell v. Canyon Lin-
e coin Mercury, Inc. (1978) 575 P 2d 688. 
^ Probable cause. 
f Whether or not security officer of depart-
* ment store had reasonable and probable 
* cause to arrest a shoplifting suspect was a 
,: question of fact for the jury. Draeger v. 
0
 Grand Central, Inc. (1974) 504 F 2d 142. 
There was sufficient evidence upon which 
to base a jury verdict denying damages for 
n false arrest, where plaintiff, an eighteen-
e year-old motorcycle rider, had placed a small 
- article of merchandise in his helmet, justify-
i. ing a reasonable suspicion that he was shop-
H lifting. Fuller v. Zinik Sporting Goods Co. 
(1975) 538 P 2d 1036. 
Jury's determination that store personnel 
did not act reasonably and had no probable 
^ cause to arrest plaintiff for shoplifting was 
supported by evidence in suit involving 
prewrapped package. Terry v. Zions Co-op. 
f Mercantile Institution (1979) 605 P 2d 314. 
' The standard applicable to detentions and 
arrests by merchants is composed of both 
* subjective and objective elements; the mer-
1 chant must allege and prove not only that he 
believed in good faith that his conduct was 
)awfu)f but also that his belief was reason-
*. able; even if the crime was not in fact being 
committed or attempted, if the merchant "in 
good faith believes that such facts are 
present as to lead him to an honest conclu-
sion that a crime is being committed by the 
person to be arrested" then he may not be 
 held liable for false arrest; in determining 
the reasonableness of the conclusion, the test 
r to be applied is one that is practical under 
the circumstances, i.e., whether a reasonable 
* and prudent man in his position would be 
justified in believing facts which would war-
P rant making the arrest. Terry v. Zions Co-op. 
\ Mercantile Institution (1979) 605 P 2d 314. 
6ACJS Arrest §§38-42. 
Law Reviews. 
The Police Dog: Possibilities for Abuse in 
Finding Probable Cause for Arrest, 1969 
Utah L. Rev. 408. 
77-7-15. Authority of peace officer to stop and question suspect — 
Grounds. A peace officer may stop any person in a public place when he 
has a reasonable suspicion to believe he has committed or is in the act 
of committing or is attempting to commit a public offense and may demand 
his name, address and an explanation of his actions. 
61 
-6-8 CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
-6-8. Judgment of removal — Service on defendant. 
onvicted." 
nterpretation of term "convicted" to mean a 
ermination by the court that the accusa-
ls constituting the basis for removal were 
e, as opposed to the alternative basis for 
judgment of removal, the defendant's admis-
sion, would reconcile this section with 
§ 77-6-7. Madesen v. Brown, 701 P.2d 1086 
(Utah 1985). 
CHAPTER 7 
VRREST, BY WHOM, AND HOW MADE 
tion 
7-2. 
7-5. 
7-5.5. 
7-12. 
7-13. 
By peace officers. 
Issuance of warrant — Time and 
place arrests may be made. 
Fee for warrant service. 
Detaining persons suspected of shop-
lifting or library theft — Persons 
authorized. 
Arrest without warrant by peace of-
ficer — Reasonable grounds, what 
constitutes — Exemption from 
civil or criminal liability. 
Section 
77-7-14. 
77-7-19. 
Person causing detention or arrest of 
person suspected of shoplifting or 
library theft — Civil and criminal 
immunity. 
Appearance required by citation — 
Arrest for failure to appear — Col-
lection of bail amounts by Office of 
Recovery Services — Motor vehi-
cle violations — Disposition of 
fines and costs. 
-7-2. By peace officers. 
\ peace officer may make an arrest under authority of a warrant or may, 
thout warrant, arrest a person: 
(1) for any public offense committed or attempted in the presence of 
any peace officer; "presence" includes all of the physical senses or any 
device that enhances the acuity, sensitivity, or range of any physical 
sense, or records the observations of any of the physical senses; 
(2) when he has reasonable cause to believe a felony has been commit-
ted and has reasonable cause to believe that the person arrested has 
committed it; 
(3) when he has reasonable cause to believe the person has committed 
a public offense, and there is reasonable cause for believing the person 
may: 
(a) flee or conceal himself to avoid arrest; 
(b) destroy or conceal evidence of the commission of the offense; or 
(c) iiyure another person or damage property belonging to another 
person. 
Eistory: C. 1953, 77-7-2, enacted by L. 
0, ch. 15, § 2; 1985, ch. 192, § 1; 1986, ch. 
, S 1. 
compiler's Notes. — The 1985 amendment 
rote Subsection (1) which formerly read, 
for a public offense committed or at-
pted in his presence." 
The 1986 amendment, effective March 17, 
1986, deleted "other than offenses under Title 
41 where any non-jurisdictional element of the 
offense is" preceding "committed or attempted" 
in Subsection (1). 
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